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NOTES
Military Justice-A Uniform Code
For the Armed Services
In May, 1951, a new uniform code for administering military justice
will become law.1 For the first tune in the history of the nation, all branches
of its armed forces will be subject to the same military code, uniform in
substance and uniform in interpretation and construction. Soldier, sailor,
and airman will be treated alike, for practically all purposes. But they
will find few radical departures from the systems authorized under the old
Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the
Disciplinary Laws of the Coast Guard, which this Uniform Code supplants.
With the creation of a separate Department of the Air Force and the
unification of the services, it was more logical to have a single code for
all branches than to construct a third code for the Air Force. In 1948,
Secretary of Defense James V Forrestal appointed a special committee,
headed by Professor Edmund Morgan, Jr., of Harvard Law School, to draft
a uniform code. The committee worked seven months to produce this
code, which covers both the substantive and the procedural law governing
military justice and its administration in all of the armed forces of the
United States.
If unification of the services required a single new code, surely the
changed concepts of military justice required no less. A courts-martial
system that worked well for a small, volunteer army of career soldiers was
not acceptable to a large, non-volunteer, citizen army.
It is not proposed, within these pages, to survey the entire body of the
new code. Much of it is a mere rearrangement and restatement of articles
'64 STAT. 108 (1949), 50 U.S.C. §§551-736 (1950). (References to U.C.M.J.
indicate numbered articles in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1950.) A
courts-martal manual, with detailed rules of procedure, regulations prescribed by
the president, and various forms and outlines, will shortly be issued as an operating
supplement to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
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found in the old regulations. The writers primarily intend to point out
only those significant changes which seem to graft concepts of civil justice
onto military law and those unchanged sections that are most notoriously
offensive to civil justice concepts.
COMMAND CONTROL
More than other single feature in military law, the influence of the
commanding officer over courts-martial has drawn critical fire. This in-
fluence has been aptly labelled "command control"'2 and consists of the
legal and illegal powers wielded over military trials by the commander. The
court's subservience to the commanding officer remains the most vital defect
in military justice.
Traditionally, the commanding officer has been empowered to order
trial for an accused, to appoint prosecution counsel and defense counsel, to
select the members of the court, and to review the court's findings and
sentence. The Uniform Code does not divest the commander of a single
one of these powers. The men chosen to serve as counsel, judge, and "jury"
are directly responsible to the convening authority, who is their command-
ing officer for purposes of assignment, efficiency rating, and promotion 3
Professor Morgan explains that the convening of courts, reference of
charges, and appointment of members were left in the hands of the com-
mander because of the "military nature of courts-martial."' This is a fre-
quent excuse for lack of reform in this area. Says Senator Wayne Morse,
a member of the subcommittee hearing testimony on the Uniform Code:
I have an mpression -in talking to military-justice men that
they are so steeped in their military-justice training that they have lost
sight of the practicality of getting rid of what, I think, are a lot of military
procedures that they can dispense with and substitute therefor out-and-out
procedures of our civilian criminal courts.'
It is ironical that men whose future in the army is entirely dependent upon
their commander's good will are appointed by this commander to a court
which is expected to be free from his influence! (
2 Farmer and Wels, Command Control -or Military Justice?, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
263 (1949), a comprehensive exposition of this infirmity in military justice struc-
ture. Note, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1377 (1949) Many commanders have remained
impartial in the performance of their duties as convening authorities. This section
of the comment concerns those who have not been so conscientious.
'Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on S. 857
and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-77 (1949). The subcommittee hearing
testimony concerning the proposed uniform code consisted of Senator Estes Kefauver,
Chairman, and Senators Millard E. Tydings, Richard B. Russell, Leverett Satonstall,
and Wayne Morse.
'Hearings, supra note 3, at 37
'Id. at 84.
'Two cases of command control in operation may be examined at this point In
Beets v. Hunter, 75 F. Supp. 825 (D. C. Kans. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 180
F. 2d 101 (10th Circ. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963, 70 Sup. Ct. 997 (1950),
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Command control can be reduced by vesting in an independent Judge
Advocate General's Corps those legal powers which have been most abused
by the comander: the right to appoint general or special courts-martial,
the right to appoint defense counsel, and the right to review the action of
the, courts.7
The illegal and indirect powers of the commander over the court grow
naturally out of the commander's position. Court members are dependent
upon his favor. Pressures may be exerted either manifestly or quite subtly,
according to the personality of the commander. For example, courts have
been told by the commander that his ordering a trial meant that he had
already concluded the man was guilty." In other cases, commanders have
requested courts to deliver the maximum sentence, so that the accused
would be forced to look to his commanding officer for clemency.P But
often, clemency was not granted as the trial court expected it to be.
Such illegal influence is prohibited under Article 3710 of the Uniform
Code and made an offense under Article 98: "Noncompliance with pro-
cedural rules." But it is extremely unlikely that these provisions will trap
any offenders or that charges will be brought against commanding officers
who violate them." Commanders with any ingenuity or craft in such
an incompetent defense counsel went through the motions of defending an accused
because he could not, as a soldier, refuse the assignment. The court said: " the
court which tried this man was saturated with tyranny [the accused] could not
have received due process of law in a trial in a court before men whose judgments
did not belong to them, who had not the will nor the power to pass freely upon the
guilt or innocence of this petitioner's offense It cannot stand the test of funda-
mental justice." Id. at 826.
In Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. Claims 1947), Lieut. Shapiro,
assigned defense counsel, showed, by a sensational device, that the defendant was
improperly accused of rape. At the court-martial, he substituted for the accused
another soldier, who was identified by prosecution witnesses as the attacker. When
Shapiro revealed the deception, the real defendant was tried, convicted, and sen-
tenced. Several days later, Shapiro was arrested. Within five hours after being
served with charges of delaying the orderly progress of a court-martial, Shapiro was
himself tried, convicted, and sentenced. The court called this a "flagrant case of
military despotism almost complete denial of plaintiff's constitutional rights."
Id. at 207.
"The reforms mentioned are among those advocated by the Special Committee on
Military Justice of the American Bar Association. Hearings, supra note 3, at 62.
'Hearings, supra note 3, at 206, from a statement by Richard H. Wels, Chairman,
Special Committee on Military Justice, New York County lawyers' Association.
'A. E. Farmer, Chairman, Committee on Military Law, War Veterans Bar Associa-
tion, claims this is not a unique experience. Hearings, supra note 3, at 87
, The article forbids the censure or reprimand of any member of a court-martial with
respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court and provides that no person
subject to military law shall attempt to coerce or unlawfully influence the action of a
court-martial in the performance of its duties.
' Can you imagme " some outraged second lieutenant preferring charges against
his command general "asks Franklin Riter, Officers' Reserve Corps. Hearings,
supra note 3, at 174.
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matters may easily dodge the prohibitions of the Uniform Code. A sug-
gestion by the commander at the officers' mess that fewer men would be
a.w.o.l. if an "example" were to be made, would hardly violate Article 37,
nor would a gentle reminder that the time has come for marking the
efficiency ratings of officers who are serving on a court-mariaL
If the commanding officer were shorn of his legal powers to convene
and appoint the court and review its findings, his illegal powers would
decline.
MORE LAWYERS
Lawyers as Judges-Th6e Law Officer
Under the Code, a "law officer" must sit on every general court-
martial.12 The law officer must be a lawyer, certified as qualified to per-
form the duties of his office by The Judge Advocate General of his branch
of the service.'3
It was the intent of the committee drafting the Code that the position of
the law officer be analogous to that of a judge of a civilian court, while the
remaining members of the court act as a jury.14 In accord with this view,
the law officer's right to vote was taken away.' 5 Now the law officer is
excluded from the closed court when it decides disputed issues.' 6 In addi-
tion to ruling on interlocutory questions of law,17 he is given the duty of
instructing the court on elements of the offense and charging the court on
presumption of innocence, effect of reasonable doubt of guilt, and burden of
proof.'8 These changes, together with the requirement that the appoint-
ment of a law officer to each general court be mandatory,'9 have stirred
considerable controversy.
'Under the old Articles of War, there was a provision for a "law member," but his
status was substantially different. A.W.8,31, A MANuAL FoR CouRTS-MARTiAL,
U. S. ARMY, 1949. This manual, containing the amended articles of war, rules of
procedure, and various forms and regulations, was established by Exec. Order No.
10020, Dec. 7, 1948, 13 F.R. 7519. It will hereinafter be cited as M.C.M., U. S.
Army, 1949.
There are three classes of courts-martial; in the order of diminishing importance,
they are: (1) General courts-martial, (2) Special courts-martial, and (3) Sum-
mary courts-martial. U.C.MJ. art. 16.
U.C.M.J, art. 26 (a).
"Hearings, supra note 3, at 35.
"U.C.M.J. art. 26 (b).
"U.C.M.J. art. 39.
' U.C.M.J. art. 51 (b) This article permits the law officer to rule upon all inter-
locutory questions arising during the proceedings, other than challenge. All rulings
on any interlocutory question other than a motion for a finding of not guilty, or the
accused's sanity, are to be final. On the question of challenges, see Note, 62 HAIrV.
L. Rnv. 1377, 1380 (1949).
"U.C.MJ. art. 51 (c)
"U.C.M.J. art. 16, 26 (a).
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Until the rule was changed in 1948,20 a law officer was required on a
general court-martial only when "available," 21 and his availability was a
matter of discretion with his commanding officer.22 Despite argument
that the new mandatory provision is too stringent- especially in time of
war, when a certified law officer might be difficult to procure- the
presence of a skilled lawyer sitting on every general court seems vitally
necessary to a fair trial.
Under the old system, the law officer sat on the court as a member and
had the right to vote, participating in all the discussions on both the law
and the facts, in addition to ruling on interlocutory questions of law.23
He was, in effect, a super-member, giving the rest of the court the benefit of
his specialized legal training. In contrast, the present system achieves a
closer similarity to civil trial proceedings.
Lawyers as Counsel
1. In Trial Courts.
As under the old Articles of War and the Articles for the Government
of the Navy, counsel in court-martial trials are appointed by the authority
convening the court-martial.2 -
In general courts-martial, it is mandatory that there be appointed a trial
counsel22 and a defense counsel, who must be lawyers, although not neces-
sarily serving as legal specialists in the armed services. Each counsel must
be certified as qualified by The Judge Advocate General of his branch of
service.20  These requirements are new to military justice.27
2'62 STAT. 629, 10 U.S.C.§1482 (1948). (A.W.11, M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1949.)
-41 STAT. 788, 10 U.S.C. §1479 (Article 8 of the Articles of War). Prior to the
1948 amendments, the articles, together with rules of procedure, and incidental
forms and regulations, are contained in A MANuAL FOR COURTS-&MARTIAL, U.S.
ARMY, 1928 (corrected to April 20, 1943), as established by Exec. Order No. 4773,
Nov. 29, 1927.
=Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103, 70 Sup. Ct. 495 (1950); Henry v. Hodges, 76 F.
Supp. 968 (S.D. N.Y. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 171 F. 2d 401 (2d Cir.
1948).
"A.W 8, 31, M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1949.
4 U.C.Mj. art. 27; A.W 11, M.C.M, U.S. Army, 1949; ARTIcLES FOR THE Gov-
BlNMENT O THE NAVY, art. 26, 38, 64 (a) (1948).
S'"Trial counsel" is the name given to the counsel for the prosecution. The term
is ambiguous, since it might be thought to include counsel for both the defense and
prosecution.
'U.C.M.J. art. 27 (b).
'Although A.W 11, M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1949 was an advance over A.W 11,
M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1928, in requiring that counsel in general court-martial trials
be members of The Judge Advocate General's Department or lawyers, if available,
the availability provision was eliminated and the requirement was made mandatory
by the Uniform Code in article 27 (b).
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In special courts-martial, no change has been effected by the Code. The
defense counsel need fulfil the above qualifications only when the prosecu-
ton counsel does.28 The aim and effect is to give the accused no right ex-
cept to be on an equal footing with the prosecution.29
In both general and special courts, the accused may be represented by
civilian counsel if he provides such counsel, or by military counsel of his
own selection if "reasonably available."30
2. In Appellate Courts.
Appellate counsel for both the government and the defense must have
the same qualifications as prescribed for counsel in general court-martial
trials.31 Appellate counsel are appointed by The Judge Advocate General,
but the accused has the right to be represented by civilian counsel, if he
provides such counsel.32
In the review of his case before a board of review or the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, the accused must be represented by counsel when: (a) the
United States is represented by counsel, or (b) the accused requests such
representation, or (c) The Judge Advocate General has forwarded a case
to the Court of Military Appeals. 33
There has been substantial opposition to the requirement of lawyers as
counsel in court-martial cases, the chief reasons advanced being: (a) the
tremendous number of courts-martial, especially in wartime, (b) the diffi-
culty of procuring sufficient lawyers with resultant delay in disposition of
cases, (c) the extreme simplicity of issues in the vast majority of courts-
martial, obviating the need for lawyers, and (d) the presence of a trained
and experienced law officer on the court, who may be requested to give in-
formation on difficult legal questions.34
But (a) a multitude of trials does not excuse an inadequate defense in
any one of them. (b) More legally trained personnel could be made
'U.C.M.J. art. 27 (c); A.W 11, M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1949.
This is dangerous because special courts-martial have far-reaching powers. They
are, for instance, authorized by Artide 19 of the Uniform Code to award bad-conduct
discharges. Such a discharge damages a man's reputation for life. Yet many of the
safeguards which the code throws around general courts-martial are not available in
special courts. Thus, not only may the prosecutor and defense counsel be persons
without legal training, but also, law officers are not required on special courts.
' U.C.M.J. art. 38 (b) The 1948 amendment of the old artides of war also al-
lowed the accused counsel of his own selection.
mU.C.M.J. art. 70 (a), 27 (b)
'"U.C.M.J. art. 70 (a), (d)
'U.C.M.J. art. 70 (c)
' Statement of Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Green, The Judge Advocate General of the
Army, Hearings, supra note 3, at 257-258.
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available by a two-part program: reassignment of lawyers already in uni-
form from non-legal tasks to courts-martial work, and a system of com-
missioning and promotion which would attract civilians to military justice
work. (c) Though an issue may be clear-cut, complex rules of procedure
and evidence must be observed in deciding it. As a result, the best presenta-
ton of a case is made by a counsel who is a legal specialist. (d) The law
officer is present only in general courts-martial. His assistance cannot be
employed in lesser courts. Even in general courts, since he is expected to
act as judge, he is not authorized to aid incompetent counsel.
It has been proposed that an office of chief defense counsel be created to
control the appointment of all defense counsel 35 This office would assume
the powers presently in The Judge Advocate General to determine which
cases to forward to the Court of Military Appeals. The right of the accused
to furnish his own civilian counsel would not be denied.
Lawyers as Rezewers; Legal Aid to Convening Authority
Members of the boards of review, acting as a second reviewing agency
and serving in the office of The Judge Advocate General, are required to
be certified lawyers.36
Staff judge advocates or legal officers aid the convening authority in
his review of the case by checking the record and writing opinions there-
on.37 These officers, though not required by the Code to be lawyers, must
be recommended by The Judge Advocate General to perform such special-
ized legal service.38 In general courts-martial, they advise the convening
authority regarding the charges, before the case is brought to trial."5
Article 6 (b) of the Code provides for a direct, independent com-
munication between a staff judge advocate or legal officer and the staff
judge advocate or legal officer of a superior or subordinate command. This
section was designed to make the staff legal officer more independent than
before by releasing him from the old "chain of command" system of com-
munication.
Since it follows that a wider use of legal assistance m court-martial cases
'This was suggested in a statement submitted to the Senate subcommittee by Pro-
fessor Arthur J. Keeffe, of Cornell Law School, Hearngs, supra note 3, at 253. This
would be to avoid the influences of command control and to invigorate the appellate
review system for the accused. As set up in the Uniform Code, The Judge Advocate
General must act in two capacities in appealing cases. He controls the appointment
of counsel on both sides of the case. To require him to be impartial is like asking
a district attorney to appeal the case of a man he has just convicted.
'U.CM.J. art 66 (a).
' U.C.M.J. art. 61. Incongruously, the convening authority may ignore this opinion.
SEN. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1949).
sU.CLJ. art. 6 (a).
U.C.MJ. art. 34 (a).
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should bring greater justice, the provisions discussed in the preceding three
sections are steps in the right direction.
APPELLATE RE Ew40
The Morgan Committee found a great divergence between Army and
Navy appellate practices: the Army system was exactingly spelled out; the
Navy review agencies acted in an advisory capacity -their methods were
quite informal. Articles 59 to 76 of the Uniform Code provide a single
system of appellate review. 1
First Revtew-By Convening Authorty
After every trial by court-martial, the record is forwarded to the con-
vening authorty.42 If the record is that of a general court, the convening
authority refers it to his staff judge advocate or legal officer, who writes an
opinion, which becomes a part of the record.43
In reviewing the record of any court-martial, the convening authority
may find apparent errors or omissions or inconsistencies. If these mistakes
can be rectified without material prejudice to the substantial rights of the
accused, the convening authority may order the record returned to the court
for revision. In acting upon the record, the convening authority has four
courses which may be open to him: (a) He may approve the findings of
guilty and the sentence or any part of it. (b) He may disapprove the
findings and the sentence and dismiss the charges. (c) Disapproving the
findings and the sentence, he may, except where there is lack of sufficient
evidence in the record to support the findings, order a rehearing before a
new court. (d) Finally, if a specification before a court-martial was dis-
missed on motion and the ruling does not amount to a finding of not guilty,
the convening authority may return the record to the court for reconsidera-
tion.
The record may not be returned to the court to reconsider a finding of
not guilty or to increase the severity of a sentence unless the sentence pre-
scribed for the offense is mandatory.44
By continuing to authorize an initial review by the convening authority,
the Uniform Code has failed to eliminate a factor of command control.
"
0The history and development of courts-martial review is traced in Fratcher, Appel-
late Revtew n Amerscat Military Law, 14 Mo. L. RIEV. 15 (1949).
"Under Article 59 (a), a finding or sentence shall not be held incorrect on the
ground of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the rights of the
accused. Article 59 (b) provides that any reviewing authority with power to ap-
prove a finding of guilty may approve, instead, so much of the finding as includes a
lesser included offense. These provisions operate at all stages of the review.
"U.C.M.J. art. 60.
" U.C.M.J. art. 61.
"The convening authority's powers of initial review are found in U.C.M.J. art. 62-64.
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After the convening authority takes final action m a general court-
martal, he sends the record to the appropriate Judge Advocate General's
Department 4 5 Records of special courts-martial which award a bad-conduct
discharge are sent to a board of review in the office of The Judge Advocate
General; 0 all other special and summary court records are sent up to be
reviewed by a single officer in the legal department of the appropriate
branch of service.47
Second Re.ew - By Board of Rewew
This review adopts Army procedure presently in effect 48 The Judge
Advocate General of each of the armed forces appoints one or more boards
of review. Each board is made up of not less than three accredited lawyers,
who may be either officers or civilians 9
As under present practice, the board reviews facts and law, weighs the
evidence, and judges the credibility of witnesses. 0 Like the first reviewing
authority, this board may do nothing to increase a sentence, though it may
order a rehearing under certain conditions.5 ' It may even dismiss the
charges entirely. The board must consider every case in which the sentence
affects a general or flag officer, cadet, or midshipman, or prescribes death,
dismissal of an officer, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or a year's
confinement or more.
5 2
After a case has been reviewed by the board, The Judge Advocate
"U.C.M.J. art. 65(a). Only the Army has a separate Judge Advocate General's
Corps. The problem of creating separate legal corps for Air and Navy has been
postponed. SEN. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949). However, for
each of these branches there is a Judge Advocate General, who will appoint boards
of review, so that each force will have its own departmental reviewing authority.
" U.C-M.J. art. 65 (b).
'"U.C.M.J. art. 65 (c).
' Under the old articles, the boards of review constituted the final review - and
then only in the more serious offenses. A.W 50V2, M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1928.
They could consider law, but not facts. Ibtd. The amendments of 1948 made
boards of review intermediate reviewing agencies by placing above them a Judicial
Council composed of three General officers. A.W 50 (a), M.C.M., U.S. Army,
1949. In addition, both the boards of review and the Judicial Council were given
authority to review facts as well as law. A.W 50 (g), M.C.M., U.S. Army, 1949.
"U.CM.J. art. 66 (a). The requirement that board members be lawyers is new.
The Coast Guard requested to be allowed to use its civilian personnel at this second
review stage. It is not expected that the other branches will use civilians. SEN. REP.
No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1949).
'U.CM.J. art. 66 (c).
'U.CM.J. art. 66 (d). If the board sets aside findings and sentence because of
lack of sufficient supporting evidence, it may not order a rehearing.
" U.C.M.J. art. 66 (b). It will consider cases involving lesser sentences if a prejudi-
cial error of law has been discovered in the office of The Judge Advocate General,
or if The Judge Advocate General so directs. U.C.M.J. art. 69.
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General either sends it back to the convening authority, directing that action
be taken as recommended by the board, 1 3 or he may -in his discretion -
send it to the third reviewing authority. 54 He has no discretion in cases
involving generals or flag officers or recommending the death sentence;
these must go to the third review.
Third Review-By Court of Military Appeals
1. Nature of the Court.
The creation of the single Court of Military Appeals is the most notable
innovation of the Uniform Code. Professor Morgan felt that it was a
vital necessity; the public would continue to agitate for reform unless it
believed the soldier was going to get the same kind of fair trial that he
would get in the federal court system. The Court of Military Appeals
gives the appearance of a federal reviewing authority.
This final appellate tribunal, sitting in Washington, D. C, will be com-
posed of three civilian judges, who are appointed by the president, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, for terms of fifteen years. Each judge
must be a member of the bar of a federal court or of the highest court of
a state; he receives the salary of a judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals and is eligible for reappointment.55
2. Functions of the Court.
The three-judge court has no power to review issues of fact but con-
siders questions of law only. 6 The drafters of the Uniform Code agreed
that the final review of facts properly lay in the board of review, where
military men probably would be more acquainted with a fact situation than
would ordinary civilians. But cogent argument before the Senate sub-
committee favored a review of facts by the Court of Military Appeals.
Professor Keeffe, of Cornell Law School, pointed out that it is often diffi-
cult to tell what is a question of fact and what is a question of law.57
Further, by refusing a review of facts to the three-judge court, the Code
chains it to the facts in the record, while allowing an evaluation of facts by
the convening authority and the military men on the board of review.-
An appeal to the three-judge court on issues of law only has been com-
'u.C.M.J. art. 66 (e).
U.C.M.J. art. 67 (b) (2).
'U.C.M.J. art. 67 (a) (1)
50U.C.M.J. art. 67 (d).
" Hearngs, supra note 3, at 254.
"Ibtd. In this respect, the Court of Military Appeals is more limited than the pres-
ent Judicial Council of three General officers. See note 48, supra. But the prime
objection is that cwoilians do not have an opportunity to review the facts; and this is
just as true under present practice, with its Judicial Council of military men.
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pared to an appeal to a federal court of appeals from a judgment based upon
facts found by a jury: if there is any substantial evidence to support the
decision of the court-martal, the Court of Military Appeals would not up-
set it on the weight of the evidence 9
As the Code now stands, the Court of Military Appeals is the final arbiter
on the law. Neither the president nor the Secretaries of the Departments of
Army, Navy, and Air may upset the court's ruling on the law."0 If the
court sets aside the finding and sentence, it may order either a rehearing 1
or that the case be dismissed. The court may return the record for further
review by the board of review; otherwise -unless the president or the
secretaries grant clemency - the record is returned to The Judge Advocate
General, who instructs the convening authority to enforce the coures de-
cision.62
Section (g) of Article 67 provides for the second important activity
of the court: an annual meeting with The Judge Advocates General to
review the operation of the Code. The group will then report to Congress
and the secretaries on the result of its studies and on data concerning cases
pending and disposed of. It may recommend any desired changes, includ-
ing amendments to the Code. It is believed that the annual report will
keep Congress alert to the problems of military justice admimstration and
the need for changes. The work of this group may be likened to that
done by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee.
3. Cases before the Court.
It must not be assumed that every case of an accused -whose sentence
may have been imposed under command control pressures - will be heard
by the new Court of Military Appeals. There are only three classes of
cases reviewable by the court. 3
(a) Cases affectng a general or flag officer or awarding a death sen-
tence. There is an automatic appeal to the Court of Military Appeals in
these cases- the only cases which must be brought before the court. If
the accused is not a general or flag officer or is not under a sentence of
death, he cannot be sure that his case will get to the three-judge court.
(b) Cases passed by a board of review whtch The Judge Advocate
General orders forwarded to the court. Under this section, it is entirely
"Hearings, supra note 3, at 55, 174.
coHeanngs, supra note 3, at 54. The president and the secretaries, though without
specific appellate powers as to guilt or innocence, do retain their powers of clemency
in certain cases: the president, in cases involving death or a general or flag officer;
the secretaries, in cases involving dismissal of officers. U.CM.J. art. 71.
1 Except where the setting aside is based on lack of sufficient evidence in the record
to support the findings. U.CW.MJ. art. 67 (e).
U.C.M.J. art. 67 (f.
'The three classes are set out in U.C.M.J. art. 67 (b).
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discretionary with The Judge Advocate General whether he shall forward
any record already reviewed by a board of review in his office. If the
record is referred to it, the court will consider only the issues raised by The
Judge Advocate General.
(c) Cases reviewed upon petnotn of the accused. After being notified
of the decision of a board of review, the accused has thirty days in which
to petition the court for review.6 This may be compared to a petition of
certiorari for review on questions of law- an accused has no guarantee that
it will be granted. There is danger that through ignorance or error, many
defendants will not take advantage of this opportunity. Review for every
case, equally and automatically, before a top civilian court, has been urged.65
This would seem to offer a soldier greater safeguards than are ordinarily
provided a civilian. But it must be remembered that no civilian has
counsel, judge, and jury appointed by a single authority when he is tried
for a criminal offense. Since it may be impractical however, to provide for
an automatic appeal for all cases, the civilian court of three judges must be
trusted to make rules regarding petitions and appeals which are simple,
dear, and equitable.
REFORMS AND RELAPSES
Before assessing the overall value of the new Code, it is necessary to
point out certain provisions not previously mentioned. Though important,
these sections are not of sufficient scope to demand broader treatment.
Double Jeopardy
When tried more than once by the military for the same act, the accused
may employ double jeopardy as a defense.66  The Uniform Code dearly
prohibits two trials for the same offense and defines a "trial" that may be
held to preclude a subsequent trial. Article 44 (c) states that where a
proceeding is dismissed by order of the convening authority or terminated
on motion of the prosecution, and where the interruption is through no
fault of the accused, it is considered a trial; the accused cannot be tried
again. The Supreme Court, in. Wade v. Hunter,67 established the rule
that such an interrupted proceeding would not be considered a trial when
the dismissal was because of urgent necessity.68  Artide 44 (c) changes
this rule. A dismissed proceeding is now considered a trial, and urgent
"'U.C.M.J. art. 67 (c)
'Professor Keeffe, Hearings, supra note 3, at 252.
'U.C.M.J. art. 44 (a)
' 336 U.S. 684, 69 Sup. Ct. 834 (1949), rehearing denied, 337 U.S. 921, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1152 (1949)
'
3The rule was formulated in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824).
The Wade case, in deciding whether court-martial action runs counter to the Fifth
Amendment's provision against double jeopardy, applied the test of the Perez case
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necessity is no longer a justification for dismissal. The difficulty of de-
termining the, presence of urgent necessity is thereby avoided, and any
possible pressure that the convening authority might exert on the accused,
by dismissing one trial and ordering another, is eliminated.
Pretial Investfgatton
A pretrial investigation is provided by the Uniform Code."9 Previously,
there was some question whether the requirement for such investigation was
mandatory or directory.70 The issue was resolved in Humphrey v. Smith,71
when the Supreme Court decided that the requirements for pretrial in-
vestigation were directory only. The new Code adopts the decision of
the Humphrey case.72
Replacement of Members of a Court
In civilian trials, it is not the general practice to replace incapacitated
jurors with substitutes who will be familiarized wth the case by a reading
of the recorded testimony. Yet, this is exactly the procedure authorized
under Article 29. Since the demeanor of a witness while actually testifying
on the stand is a useful factor in determining his credibility, and it is im-
possible to indicate this on the record, the practice set out in Article 29 is
to be condemned.
73i
Enlisted Men on Courts-Marttal
Under Article 25 (c), enlisted men may serve on general and special
courts when the accused is an enlisted man, and he requests, in writing, their
presence. Although theoretically desirable, the provision actually may not
operate as beneficially as intended. It is likely that the enlisted men ap-
pointed by their commanding officer to the court will be those eager to
to military trials. Application of the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provi-
sions has been considered chiefly in civil, rather than military, court proceedings.
See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 Sup. Ct. 149 (1947); Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100, 24 Sup. Ct. 797 (1904); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.
2d 640 (10th Cir. 1936).
'At this investigation, the accused is to be advised of the charges against him, to
be given full opportunity to cross-examine witnesses against him and to present any-
thing he desires in his own behalf. U.C.MJ. art. 32. See Comment, 34 IA. L. REV.
686 (1949).
" If mandatory, failure to provide such investigation would prevent any court-martial
from acquiring jurisdiction to try the case, and if the case were tried, the finding of
the court-martial would be null and void. The accused could then employ the writ
of habeus corpus in the federal courts to obtain freedom. If directory, the accused
would have no such recourse, and his appeal would be limited to regular channels.
See Note, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 67 (1949).
' 336 U.S. 695, 69 Sup. Ct. 830 (1949), rehearing denied, 337 U.S. 934, 69 Sup.
Ct. 1492 (1949).
"U.C.MJ. art. 32 (d).
" It will be noted from the section on Appellate Review, that the board of review
also is authorized to weigh evidence and judge credibility of witnesses from a reading
of the record. Criticism of the board's power to weigh evidence however, is not
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prove as responsible disciplinarians as their superiors. Further, enlisted
men will serve upon request only when they are available.
74
Extenston of Jatsdictoon
The Code extends the jurisdiction of military courts to certain classes
of persons not previously subjected thereto. Among those now subject
to court-martial action are: discharged persons who are charged with having
committed, while subject to the Code, a serious offense against the Code;ts
and reserve personnel while on inactive duty training authorized by vol-
untarily accepted written orders subjecting them to the Code. 0
Punttwe Artcles
With some exceptions, the punitive articles have been umproved by
redefinition of offenses and simplification of language. Yet certain articles
remain to be criticized.
The broad language in Articles 104 and 106 is open to a construction
bringing any civilian within courts-martial jurisdiction for "aiding the
enemy" and "spying." Whereas other punitive articles are worded: "Any
person subject to this code who ," Articles 104 and 106 commence by
stating: "Any persons who ,"7 thereby not limiting their application to
those classes of persons which Articles 2 and 3 painstakingly enumerate
as being subject to the Code. "Any person" could include civilians, the
majority of whom were not intended by these jurisdictional provisions to
be made subject, in general, to punishment by military courts. Despite this,
and despite the established rule that civilians are not to be tried by military
courts - even in tine of war - when the civil courts are open to them,71
Articles 104 and 106 conceivably could be construed to allow such civilians
to be tried by courts-martial in wartime.
justified since requiring all the witnesses to appear before the board would be ia-
practicable and would be just another trial, to which the accused is not entitled.
In the ortgonal trial however, the accused is entitled to a guarantee that each and
every member of the court shall have the opportunity of observing all the witnesses.
4" unless eligible enlisted persons cannot be obtained on account of physical
conditions or military exigencies." U.C.M.J. art. 25 (c) (1) It is difficult to
visualize a case in which an officer would be forced to serve where an enlisted man
is not available, since enlisted men are generally more plentiful than officers. If a
bona fide reason for this provision exists, it eludes the writers.
" U.C.M.J. art. 3 (a) The offense must be one punishable by confinement of five
years or more and for which the person cannot be tried in the federal, state, terri-
torial, or District of Columbia courts. Ibid.
"
0U.C.M.J. art. 2 (3)
' The attention of the Senate subcommittee was called to the wording of Artides 104
and 106. Hearings, supra note 3, at 127, 254. Query, by declining to change the
wording, did the subcommittee intend that Articles 104 and 106 should apply to
civilians?
' Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U.S. 1866), established the rule that when the civil
courts are open, civilians may not be tried by military courts. However, the Uniform
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Article 15 (a) (2) (F), which preserves as a part of the disciplinary
power of the commanding officer of a ship, the authority to confine a man
on bread and water or reduced rations for three days, is indefensible. Such
harsh punishment is not necessary to keep a ship at sea, with its limited
manpower, in operation; extra duty will do as well. This section is an
anachronism and should be removed.
Miscellany
Reciprocal jurisdiction is found in Article 17 of the Code, which gives
each branch of service, subject to regulation by the president, courts-martial
jurisdiction over all persons subject to the Code. However, intermediate
review is carried out by the branch of service of which the accused is a
member. Modern warfare, with its joint operations among the services,
makes this practice necessary as a practical convenience.
The Uniform Code provides that any person sentenced to confinement
by a court-martial or military tribunal may now be confined in any penal
or correctional institution under the control of the United States.7 9 This
includes federal penitentiaries and jails. This is a distinct improvement
in handling military prisoners, increasing the possibilities of their rehabili-
tation, and releasing the strain on inadequate military prisons.
CONCLUSION
As the first attempt at establishing a single court-martial system for
all departments of the armed forces, the Uniform Code cannot be expected
to prove a panacea for all the ills of military justice. It preserves the com-
manding officer's grip over the trials of his men. Top reviewing agencies
remain only remotely accessible to defendants not under sentence of death.
Yet, certain hard-won reforms are incorporated. More expert legal aid
is guaranteed the accused. There has been created a supreme civilian re-
viewing authority, which holds the greatest promise of liberalizing appeal
techniques in the future.
The Code is written in understandable, non-technical language. There
should be no difficulty in interpreting most of its sections. But in the final
analysis, its equitable operation depends largely upon the character of the
men who will administer it: the lawyers acting as counsel and judges, the




Code is a congressional enactment, and Artides 104 and 106, being a part thereof,
might very well destroy the doctrine of the Mulligan case, making it inapplicable on
the basis that in the Milligan case, there was no Act of Congress vesting in a military
commission the power to try the offense there involved.
7'U.CMJ. art. 58.
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